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Abstract	and	Keywords
Moral	judgments	about	an	action	are	influenced	by	the	action’s	intentionality.	The
reverse	is	also	true:	judgments	of	intentionality	can	be	influenced	by	an	action’s	moral
valence.	For	example,	respondents	judge	a	harmful	side-effect	of	an	intended	outcome	to
be	more	intentional	than	a	helpful	side-effect.	Debate	continues	regarding	the
mechanisms	underlying	this	“side-effect	effect”	and	the	conditions	under	which	it	will
persist.	The	research	behind	this	chapter	tested	whether	the	side-effect	effect	is	intact	in
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adolescents	with	psychopathic	traits,	who	are	characterized	by	persistent	immoral
behavior,	deficient	moral	emotions,	and	impairments	in	some	forms	of	moral	judgment.
Results	showed	no	differences	between	healthy	adolescents	and	those	with	psychopathic
traits:	both	groups	judged	harmful	side-effects	to	be	more	intentional	than	helpful	side-
effects	by	an	approximately	2:1	ratio.	The	chapter	discusses	these	results	in	light	of
hypothesized	mechanisms	underlying	the	side-effect	effect,	and	in	light	of	our	current
understanding	of	moral	reasoning	deficits	in	psychopathy.
Keywords:			psychopathy,	callous-unemotional,	side-effect	effect,	moral	judgment,	intentionality,	social
norm,	adolescents
Judgments	of	the	intentional	status	and	moral	status	of	an	action	may	be	reciprocally
related.	That	the	moral	seriousness	of	an	action	is	moderated	by	its	intentionality	is	well
established	(Malle	and	Nelson,	2003;	Mangan,	1949).	Morally	bad	outcomes	that	the
agent	intends	are	more	reprehensible	than	those	that	are	foreseen,	which	are	in	turn
more	reprehensible	than	outcomes	that	are	neither	intended	nor	foreseen.	The	reverse
also	appears	to	be	the	case:	that	is,	the	intentional	status	of	an	action	can	also	be
moderated	by	its	moral	valence	(Knobe	and	Mendlow,	2004;	Knobe,	2003).	For	example,
a	morally	bad	outcome	that	is	the	side-effect	of	an	(p.132)	 intended	outcome	is	typically
perceived	as	more	intentional	than	an	identically	framed	morally	good	outcome—a
phenomenon	known	as	the	side-effect	effect.	This	effect	has	been	shown	to	be
remarkably	robust,	emerging	across	cultures,	in	young	children,	and	in	patient
populations	with	other	deficits	in	moral	judgments,	including	patients	with	autism	and	with
damage	to	the	prefrontal	cortex	(Knobe	and	Burra,	2006;	Leslie	et	al.,	2006;	Young	et	al.,
2006;	Zalla	et	al.,	2010).	The	present	research	assesses	whether	the	side-effect	effect
emerges	in	individuals	with	psychopathic	traits.	Psychopathy	is	a	disorder	associated	with
pervasive	immoral	behavior	and	with	deficits	in	some	forms	of	moral	reasoning.	In
assessing	whether	the	side-effect	effect	remains	intact	in	psychopathy,	we	may	stand	to
gain	an	improved	understanding	of	the	mechanisms	underlying	the	side-effect	effect	as
well	as	an	improved	understanding	of	moral	judgments	in	psychopathy.
The	perhaps	paradoxical	finding	that	the	moral	status	of	an	action	affects	its	perceived
intentionality	was	discovered	by	Joshua	Knobe	(Knobe	and	Mendlow,	2004;	Knobe,
2003),	in	studies	probing	responses	to	protagonists	whose	actions	brought	about	morally
good	versus	bad	outcomes.	Participants	in	these	studies	read	the	following	vignette:
The	vice-president	of	a	company	went	to	the	chairman	of	the	board	and	said,	“We
are	thinking	of	starting	a	new	program.	It	will	help	us	increase	profits,	but	it	will	also
harm	the	environment.”	The	chairman	of	the	board	answered,	“I	don’t	care	at	all
about	harming	the	environment.	I	just	want	to	make	as	much	profit	as	I	can.	Let’s
start	the	new	program.”	They	started	the	new	program.	Sure	enough,	the
environment	was	harmed.
Participants	were	overwhelmingly	likely	(by	a	4:1	ratio)	to	say	that	the	chairman	in	this
vignette	intentionally	harmed	the	environment.	But	when	the	moral	outcome	of	the
vignette	was	changed	such	that	the	environment	was	helped	rather	than	harmed,
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ascriptions	of	intentionality	disappeared.	Now	participants	were	overwhelmingly	likely
(again,	by	a	4:1	ratio)	to	say	that	the	chairman	did	not	intentionally	help	the	environment
(Knobe,	2003).	The	vignette	makes	clear	that	the	chairman	is	indifferent	to	the	side-effects
of	his	actions.	This	means	that	judging	either	the	harmful	or	helpful	side-effect	to	be
intentional	violates	established	accounts	of	intentional	action,	which	stipulate	that	intent
and	desire	must	accompany	intentional	action	(Malle	and	Knobe,	1997).	Because	the
harm	and	help	vignettes	differ	only	in	the	moral	valence	of	(p.133)	 the	side-effect,	the
effect	has	been	interpreted	to	mean	that	moral	appraisals	influence	attributions	of	intent
(Uttich	and	Lombrozo,	2010).	If	this	is	the	case,	it	stands	to	reason	that	individuals	in
whom	moral	appraisals	are	defective	may	fail	to	exhibit	the	side-effect	effect	in	response
to	similar	scenarios.
Psychopathy	is	a	developmental	disorder	associated	with	a	range	of	moral	deficits	(Blair,
2007).	In	both	youths	and	adults,	this	disorder	is	characterized	by	two	domains	of
dysfunction:	first,	affective	and	interpersonal	processes	such	as	callousness,	reduced
remorse,	and	shallow	affect;	and	second,	antisocial	and	under-regulated	behaviors,
including	stimulation	seeking,	poor	regulation	of	anger,	and	serious	criminal	behavior
(Forth	et	al.,	2003).	Due	to	the	prevalence	of	immoral	behaviors	among	individuals	with
psychopathic	traits—behaviors	that	may	include	aggression,	deceit,	conning,	property
crimes,	and	threats	and	bullying—potential	moral	reasoning	impairments	in	this	population
have	been	the	topic	of	extensive	investigations	(Aharoni	et	al.,	2011;	Blair,	1995;	Blair	et
al.,	1995;	Koenigs	et	al.,	2012;	Marsh	and	Cardinale,	2012;	Marsh	et	al.,	2011a).
Early	assessments	of	moral	reasoning	in	psychopathy	included	investigations	of	the
moral/conventional	distinction	in	healthy	and	psychopathic	populations	(Blair,	1995;	Fisher
and	Blair,	1998).	Moral	violations	are	those	that	result	in	harm	to	a	victim	(e.g.	hitting
somebody),	in	contrast	with	conventional	violations,	which	result	in	violations	of	social
norms	(e.g.	talking	out	of	turn)	(Turiel,	1983).	Whereas	healthy	children	and	adults
distinguish	moral	violations	as	more	serious	and	less	modifiable	by	changes	in	social
norms	relative	to	conventional	violations,	psychopathic	children	and	adults	may	be	less
likely	to	make	this	distinction	(Blair	et	al.,	1995;	Blair,	1995).	When	pressed	to	justify	why
moral	violations	are	unacceptable,	psychopathic	respondents	are	also	more	likely	than
controls	to	refer	to	social	conventions	or	rules	than	to	the	welfare	of	the	victim	(Blair,
1995).	These	findings	have	led	to	hypotheses	that	psychopathy	impairs	the	ability	to	use
information	about	a	victim’s	pain	and	distress	to	generate	appropriate	judgments	about
violations	that	result	in	victim	suffering	(Blair,	2005).
That	psychopathy	is	particularly	likely	to	result	in	moral	reasoning	impairments	for
violations	that	result	in	harm	or	distress	to	a	victim	has	been	supported	by	more	recent
investigations.	Koenigs	and	colleagues	found	that,	when	judging	classic	trolley	dilemmas,
psychopaths	who	are	(p.134)	 also	low	in	anxiety	are	more	likely	than	controls	to
endorse	utilitarian	outcomes	even	when	they	require	personally	harming	an	innocent
victim	(Koenigs	et	al.,	2012).	Glenn	and	colleagues	found	that	psychopathy	reduces
support	for	moral	considerations	of	harm	prevention	and	fairness	while	minimally	affecting
support	for	other	moral	domains,	including	domains	relevant	to	social	convention,	such	as
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respect	for	authority	and	ingroup	loyalty	(Glenn	et	al.,	2009).	Marsh	and	Cardinale	found
that	psychopathy	is	associated	with	greater	acceptance	of	frightening	others	(but	not
causing	other	emotions,	such	as	happiness,	disgust,	or	anger)	(Marsh	and	Cardinale,
2012).	Finally,	Young	and	colleagues	found	that	psychopaths	are	impaired	in	judging	the
moral	seriousness	of	accidental	harm—a	result	that	the	authors	interpret	as	reflecting
impaired	appreciation	of	the	emotional	impact	of	even	accidental	harm	to	a	victim	(Young
et	al.,	2012).	Together,	these	results	are	consistent	with	the	idea	that	psychopathy
reduces	the	influence	of	information	relating	to	the	distress	of	a	victim	when	forming
moral	judgments.	In	addition,	the	findings	of	Young	and	colleagues	suggest	that
judgments	of	moral	seriousness	in	psychopathy	are	influenced	by	attributions	of
intention.	What	has	not	previously	been	tested	is	whether	the	reverse	is	also	true:	does
the	moral	seriousness	of	an	outcome	affect	judgments	of	intentionality	in	individuals	with
psychopathic	traits?	Will	the	side-effect	effect	emerge	in	this	population?
Whether	we	expect	to	observe	an	intact	side-effect	effect	in	psychopathy	depends	in	part
on	the	putative	mechanism	of	the	effect—a	topic	that	has	been	the	subject	of	considerable
debate	(Knobe,	2010).	One	framework	applied	to	the	effect	focuses	on	the	moral
emotions	a	respondent	may	have	upon	reading	vignettes	about	harmdoers,	such	as
blame	(Alicke	and	Rose,	2010;	Alicke,	2008),	in	line	with	the	idea	that	negative	affect
toward	an	agent	can	bias	judgments	of	the	agent’s	intentionality	(Malle	and	Nelson,	2003).
The	culpable	control	model	posited	by	Alicke	and	colleagues	assumes	that	respondents
who	read	the	scenario	featuring	the	chairman	whose	actions	either	harm	or	help	the
environment	draw	conclusions	about	the	character	of	the	chairman	based	on	his	actions:
that	he	is	morally	reprehensible	if	he	does	not	care	that	his	actions	will	harm	the
environment,	but	that	he	is	merely	not	morally	admirable	if	he	does	not	care	that	his
actions	will	help	the	environment.	Information	about	morally	reprehensible	agents	is	then
processed	in	a	sort	of	“blame	validation	mode.”	Inferring	that	a	morally	reprehensible
agent	acted	(p.135)	 intentionally	facilitates	assigning	blame	for	the	action	(Alicke	and
Rose,	2010).	An	alternative	mechanism	postulated	by	Knobe	(Knobe,	2010;	Pettit	and
Knobe,	2009)	is	that	respondents	infer	intentionality	not	via	moral	emotions	but	by
estimating	the	distance	between	the	agent’s	level	of	concern	about	the	effects	of	his
action	and	the	expected	degree	of	concern	for	a	prototypical	protagonist.	An	agent	who	is
unconcerned	about	an	outcome	that	most	people	would	find	unfavorable	may	therefore
be	viewed	as	being	actively	in	favor	of	the	harmful	outcome	(Knobe,	2010),	perhaps
because	respondents	seek	out	counter-normative	mental	states	to	account	for	actions
that	violate	norms	(Uttich	and	Lombrozo,	2010).
The	two	postulated	mechanisms	predict	different	outcomes	for	tests	of	the	side-effect
effect	in	psychopathy.	If	moral	emotions	are	responsible	for	asymmetrical	attributions	of
intention	following	good	and	bad	outcomes,	psychopathic	traits	may	lead	to	a	reduced	or
absent	side-effect	effect.	This	outcome	should	be	particularly	likely	if	the	morally	bad
outcome	in	question	is	clearly	framed	as	resulting	in	distress	to	a	victim.	This	is	consistent
with	findings	that	moral	judgments	of	psychopaths	and	non-psychopaths	are	particularly
likely	to	diverge	in	response	to	a	victim’s	suffering	or	distress.	If,	however,	comparison	of
the	agent’s	response	to	a	socially	normative	response	is	the	mechanism	by	which
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respondents	attribute	intentionality,	the	side-effect	effect	may	be	intact	in	psychopathy.
This	is	consistent	with	the	idea	that	judgments	that	are	made	with	reference	to	social
norms	and	conventions	are	relatively	unaffected	in	psychopathy.	With	these	alternative
hypotheses	in	mind,	we	set	out	to	assess	whether	the	side-effect	effect	emerges	in
adolescents	with	psychopathic	traits	as	compared	to	healthy	control	adolescents.
Method
Participants
Participants	were	thirty-seven	male	and	female	adolescents	aged	10	to	17.	They	were
recruited	from	the	local	community	using	fliers,	newspaper	advertisements,	and
recruitment	tables	at	community	events.	Of	these	participants,	twenty-three	were
healthy	controls	and	fourteen	were	classified	as	adolescents	with	psychopathic	traits.	The
two	groups	of	participants	did	not	significantly	differ	in	age,	gender	distribution,	or
average	IQ	(Table	5.1).	A	trained	clinician	assessed	all	children	using	the	Schedule	for
Affective	(p.136)
Table	5.1.	Participants	and	clinical	measures
Variable Healthy	control	(N
=	23)
Psychopathic	traits	(N
=	14)
p-
value
Age,	y	(SD) 14.1	(1.8) 14.2	(2.1) >	0.05
IQ,	mean	(SD) 108.1	(12.7) 100.1	(10.0) >	0.05
Male	sex,	no.	(%) 12	(52%) 9	(64%) >	0.05
Pediatric	psychopathic	trait	rating	scale	scores,	mean	(SD)
Antisocial	Process	Screening
Device
5.5	(3.9) 28.8	(4.6) <
0.001
Psychopathy	Checklist:	Youth
Version
— 24.3	(3.4) —
Disorders	and	Schizophrenia	for	School-Age	Children—Present	and	Lifetime	Version
(Kaufman	et	al.,	1997).	Exclusionary	criteria	for	both	groups	included	psychosis,
pervasive	developmental	disorders,	Tourette’s	syndrome,	mood	or	anxiety	disorders,
neurological	disorders,	IQ<80,	or	medical	illness	severe	enough	to	require	treatment.
Adolescents	were	classified	as	psychopathic	following	a	score≥20	on	the	Antisocial
Process	Screening	Device	(Frick	and	Hare,	2002)	and	a	score≥20	on	the	Psychopathy
Checklist:	Youth	Version	(Forth	et	al.,	2003).	Participants	in	the	comparison	group	were
required	to	score<20	on	the	Antisocial	Process	Screening	Device.	This	study	was
approved	by	the	institutional	review	board	at	the	National	Institute	of	Mental	Health.	The
parent	or	legal	guardian	of	each	participant	provided	written	informed	consent	before	the
study	began;	participants	provided	informed	assent.
Clinical	measures
The	Antisocial	Process	Screening	Device	(APSD;	Frick	and	Hare,	2001).	The	APSD
detects	antisocial	behavior	in	youths,	including	psychopathic	traits	and	conduct	and
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impulsivity	problems.	The	twenty-item	parent-completed	scale	has	a	three-factor
structure	comprised	of	the	following	dimensions:	Callous/Unemotional,	Narcissism,	and
Impulsivity.	Consistent	with	prior	studies	(Finger	et	al.,	2008;	Marsh	et	al.,	2008;	Marsh
et	al.,	2011b)	a	score	of≥20	was	chosen	as	a	cutoff	score	for	classification	of	high
psychopathic	traits.
(p.137)	 Psychopathy	Checklist:	Youth	Version	(PCL:YV;	Forth	et	al.,	2007).	The	PCL:YV
was	adapted	by	Hare	and	colleagues	to	measure	psychopathic	traits	in	adolescents.
Based	on	a	semi-structured	interview	and	collateral	information,	two	trained	researchers
assessed	interpersonal,	affective,	and	behavioral	features	related	to	psychopathic	traits	in
youths.	The	two	researchers	demonstrated	good	inter-rater	reliability	(R=0.91).	The
PCL-YV	is	comprised	of	a	twenty-item	rating	scale.	Consistent	with	prior	studies	(Finger
et	al.,	2011;	Marsh	et	al.,	2011a;	White	et	al.,	2012)	a	score	of≥20	was	chosen	as	a	cutoff
score	for	classification	of	psychopathic	traits.
Experimental	task
The	experimental	task	was	adapted	from	tasks	previously	used	to	assess	the	side-effect
effect	in	studies	of	children	(Pellizzoni	et	al.,	2009).	Three	vignettes	were	generated,	each
with	three	variants	that	featured,	respectively,	a	positive,	negative,	or	neutrally	valenced
outcome,	for	a	total	of	nine	scenarios.	One	sample	vignette	featured	one	child	showing	a
frog	to	another	child	(with	three	possible	outcomes).	The	variants	of	this	vignette	read	as
follows:
This	story	is	about	a	boy	named	Andy.	Andy	has	found	a	frog	in	his	yard.	Now,
Andy	loves	frogs.	A	girl	in	Andy’s	neighborhood	named	Nicole	[positive:	loves
frogs	too;	negative:	hates	frogs;	neutral:	has	never	seen	a	frog	before].
Andy	wants	to	bring	the	frog	over	to	Nicole’s	house.	If	he	brings	the	frog	over,	she
will	[positive:	be	happy;	negative:	get	upset;	neutral:	see	a	frog	for	the	first
time].	Andy	says,	“I	don’t	care	that	Nicole	will	[positive:	be	happy;	negative:	get
upset;	neutral:	see	a	frog	for	the	first	time].	I	am	going	to	bring	the	frog	over
because	I	want	to.”	So	Andy	brings	the	frog	over	to	Nicole’s	house	and	she
[positive:	is	happy;	negative:	gets	upset;	neutral:	sees	a	frog	for	the	first
time].
Two	additional	vignettes	were	created:	one	featured	a	child	playing	a	CD	that	causes
another	child	to	be	happy,	get	upset,	or	tap	her	foot;	and	one	featured	a	child	who	tells
ghost	stories	that	cause	another	child	to	be	happy,	get	upset,	or	fall	asleep.	Because
distinctions	in	moral	reasoning	between	individuals	with	and	without	psychopathic	traits
are	most	likely	to	emerge	in	the	context	of	victim	distress,	the	consequence	of	all	the
negatively	valenced	scenarios	was	a	child	becoming	upset.
Three	versions	of	the	task	were	created,	and	each	child	completed	only	one	version.	Each
version	featured	one	of	each	vignette	(frog,	CD,	ghost	stories),	with	the	valence	of	the
vignette	counterbalanced	across	versions.	(p.138)	 So,	for	example,	one	version	of	the
task	featured	the	neutral	frog	vignette,	the	negative	CD	vignette,	and	the	positive	ghost
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stories	vignette;	another	version	featured	the	positive	frog	vignette,	the	neutral	CD
vignette,	and	the	negative	ghost	stories	vignette,	and	so	on.	The	side-effect	effect	task
was	programmed	using	Eprime,	which	allowed	the	order	in	which	participants	read	the
vignettes	to	be	randomized	across	participants.	After	reading	each	vignette,	participants
answered	three	questions:
(1)	Does	the	agent	care	[about	the	outcome	of	the	side-effect]?
(2)	Did	the	agent	[cause	the	outcome	of	the	side-effect]	on	purpose?
(3)	Was	[the	outcome	of	the	side-effect]	a	good	thing?
Questions	were	answered	using	a	five-point	scale	(1=definitely	no;	5=definitely	yes).
Participants	completed	testing	on	a	PC	laptop	in	a	single	testing	session	in	a	private	testing
room	at	the	National	Institute	of	Mental	Health.	While	they	completed	the	measure,
participants	were	monitored	by	a	researcher	who	provided	participants	with	clarification
as	needed.	For	most	children,	the	measure	was	administered	as	part	of	a	larger	battery
of	behavioral	testing	that	included	questionnaires	and	computer	tasks	assessing	learning,
reasoning,	and	reaction	times.
Results
For	each	question,	a	2	(Group)	×	3	(Valence)	ANOVA	was	conducted	to	assess	the
interaction	of	moral	valence	and	intentionality	across	groups.	For	the	“on	purpose”
question,	a	main	effect	of	valence	emerged,	F(2,70)=30.518,	p<0.001,	such	that
negatively	valenced	outcomes	were	viewed	as	more	intentional	(M=3.92,	SD=1.34)	than
neutral	(M=2.41,	SD=1.69)	or	positively	valenced	outcomes	(M=2.16,	SD=1.48)	(Figure
5.1).	The	results	of	within-subject	contrast	tests	indicated	that	the	pattern	of	the	effect
was	primarily	linear,	F(1,35)=31.360,	p<0.001,	rather	than	quadratic,	F(1,35)=7.837,
p=0.052.
The	side-effect	effect	was	consistent	across	groups.	Negatively	valenced	side-effects
were	viewed	as	more	intentional	than	positively	valenced	side-effects	by	both	healthy,
t(22)=–5.016,	p<0.001,	and	psychopathic,	t(13)=–3.122,	p=0.008,	adolescents.	A	virtually
identical	proportion	of	healthy	(65.2%)	and	psychopathic	(64.3%)	adolescents	viewed	the
negatively	valenced	scenario	as	more	intentional	than	the	positively	valenced	scenario.
(p.139)
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Figure	5.1 	Moral	valence	and	intentionality.
Consistent	with	this	finding,	no	significant	valence	by	group	interaction	was	observed,
F(2,70)=0.325,	p=0.724.	A	marginally	significant	main	effect	of	group	was	identified,	such
that	psychopathic	adolescents	viewed	all	side-effects	as	more	intentional	than	did	healthy
adolescents,	F(1,35)=3.698,	p=0.063.	Across	valences,	adolescents	with	psychopathic
traits	viewed	the	agents’	behavior	as	more	intentional	than	did	controls.	For	positively
valenced	outcomes,	the	group	difference	was	M=0.54,	for	neutral	outcomes	M=0.96,
and	for	negatively	valenced	outcomes	M=0.48.	None	of	these	differences	were
statistically	significant	(all	ps	>	0.10)	(Figure	5.1).
No	main	effects	or	interactions	emerged	for	judgments	of	whether	the	agent	cared	about
the	outcome.	Very	little	variance	was	observed	in	response	to	this	question,	either
across	groups	or	across	valences,	with	75%	to	90%	of	participants	supplying	the	extreme
answer	(1/the	agent	definitely	did	not	care	about	side-effect).	For	judgments	of	whether
the	outcome	was	a	good	thing,	a	main	effect	of	valence,	F(2,70)=159.35,	p	<	0.001,	was
observed,	with	higher	ratings	for	positive	scenarios	(M=4.64,	SD=0.63)	than	neutral
(M=3.22,	SD=1.18)	or	negative	(M=1.30,	SD=0.52)	scenarios.	A	main	effect	of	group	was
observed	for	ratings	of	goodness,	F(1,35)=4.127,	p=0.05,	such	that	psychopathic
adolescents	rated	all	outcomes	to	be	better	than	did	healthy	adolescents	(p.140)
Figure	5.2 	Moral	valence	and	goodness.
(Figure	5.2).	No	significant	interaction	was	observed	in	response	to	this	question.
We	next	calculated	correlations	among	the	various	rating	scales	across	groups.	So,	for
example,	we	assessed	whether	ratings	of	caring	or	goodness	predicted	judgments	of
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intentionality	across	the	sample.	The	only	significant	correlation	among	these	variables
was	between	assessments	of	caring	and	intentionality	for	positive	statements.	Across
participants,	assessments	of	how	much	the	protagonists	cared	about	the	good	outcomes
positively	predicted	how	intentional	those	outcomes	was	judged	to	be,	r(35)=0.484,
p<0.05	(Bonferroni	corrected	for	multiple	comparisons).	This	effect	was	driven	largely	by
the	responses	of	the	healthy	participants,	r(23)=0.63,	p=0.001,	rather	than	the
participants	with	psychopathic	traits,	r(12)=0.29,	ns.	Judgments	of	the	goodness	of	the
various	outcomes	were	not	associated	with	ratings	of	caring	or	intentionality.
Discussion
We	found	that	the	moral	valence	of	an	outcome	significantly	affects	judgments	of
intentionality	in	both	healthy	adolescents	and	adolescents	with	psychopathic	traits.
Although	psychopathic	adolescents	exhibit	heightened	immoral	behavior,	and	although
moral	reasoning	deficits	have	previously	been	identified	in	psychopathy,	adolescents	with
(p.141)	 psychopathic	traits	show	an	intact	side-effect	effect.	Both	healthy	adolescents
and	adolescents	with	psychopathic	traits	showed	nearly	identical	patterns	of	attributing
greater	intentionality	to	agents	whose	actions	resulted	in	morally	negative	outcomes	than
to	agents	whose	actions	resulted	in	morally	positive	outcomes.	In	both	groups,	the
proportion	of	adolescents	who	attributed	more	intentionality	to	agents	in	the	negative
than	the	positive	outcome	scenarios	was	comparable	to	the	proportions	observed	in
previous	experimental	studies	(Knobe	and	Burra,	2006;	Knobe,	2003;	Leslie	et	al.,	2006;
Young	et	al.,	2006).	In	addition,	our	task	included	outcomes	that	were	neutral	in	valence,
and	judgments	of	intentionality	in	response	to	these	outcomes	generally	fell	between
those	of	positively	and	negatively	valenced	outcomes,	as	indicated	by	a	predominantly
linear	pattern	of	means	across	conditions.
How	can	these	findings	help	to	explain	the	mechanisms	underlying	the	side-effect	effect?
Prior	evidence	suggests	that	psychopathy	is	more	likely	to	alter	moral	judgments	than
judgments	related	to	social	convention	and	norms	(Blair,	2007).	That	the	side-effect	effect
is	intact	in	psychopathy	is	consistent	with	suggestions	that	this	effect	results	from
comparisons	of	the	agent	with	a	prototypical	social	actor—a	judgment	that	requires
understanding	the	moral	norms	of	the	social	group	(Knobe,	2010;	Pettit	and	Knobe,
2009).	Knobe	has	proposed	that	attributions	of	intentionality	to	actors	in	vignettes	like
those	featured	in	this	study	rely	on	the	distance	between	the	agent’s	concern	about	the
results	of	his	actions	and	how	concerned	one	would	expect	a	typical	person	to	be	in	that
situation	(Knobe,	2010;	Pettit	and	Knobe,	2009).	For	example,	participants	in	our	study
read	about	a	boy	named	Andy	who	brought	a	frog	over	to	a	frog-loathing	neighbor’s
house	because	he	wanted	to,	and	who	claimed	he	did	not	care	that	the	neighbor	would
get	upset.	Adolescents	both	with	and	without	psychopathic	traits	perceived	that	Andy
upset	his	neighbor	on	purpose,	despite	their	agreement	that	he	“did	not	care”	about	the
effects	of	his	actions.	Because	all	of	our	participants	recognized	that	upsetting	someone
else	is	objectively	bad	(no	group	differences	in	this	judgment	were	observed),
participants	may	have	inferred	that	Andy’s	behavior	was	so	far	from	the	anticipated
default	that	in	professing	not	to	care,	he	was	in	essence	actively	in	favor	of	upsetting	his
neighbor.	This	kind	of	judgment	relies	on	some	minimal	moral	understanding,	insofar	as
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respondents	can	report	that	causing	someone	else	to	be	upset	is	a	bad	outcome.
However,	any	moral	(p.142)	 assessments	upon	which	the	side-effect	effect	rest	do	not
seem	comparable	to	moral	acceptability	judgments	that	rely	upon	empathic	responses	to
a	victim’s	distress.
Some	explanations	for	the	side-effect	effect	do	emphasize	moral	emotions	that	follow
negative	outcomes,	for	example,	blame	(Alicke	and	Rose,	2010;	Alicke,	2008).	Are	these
accounts	consistent	with	the	finding	that	the	side-effect	effect	is	intact	in	psychopathy?
Blame	is	the	response	to	an	agent	whose	actions	cause	harmful	consequences	that	are
seen	as	foreseeable	and	avoidable.	Like	other	moral	emotions,	blame	serves	useful	social
purposes.	Holding	reckless	or	negligent	actors	to	account	for	their	misdeeds	perhaps
reduces	the	likelihood	that	they	will	repeat	those	misdeeds	(Alicke,	2008).	Blame	is
thought	to	result	from	negative	evaluations	of	an	agent’s	behavior,	which	are	thought	to
be	rapid	and	automatic	(Bargh	and	Chartrand,	1999).	Once	instantiated,	blame	is
suggested	to	lead	to	a	“blame	validation	mode”	whereby	people	search	for	some	party	to
whom	they	can	assign	the	blame	(Alicke	and	Rose,	2010).	The	moral	tenor	of	an	action	can
influence	blame	attributions,	as	Alicke	and	colleagues	found	when	they	asked	participants
to	consider	the	case	of	a	student	who	was	in	a	car	accident	while	either	speeding	home	to
hide	his	cocaine	stash,	or	speeding	home	to	hide	a	gift	for	his	parents.	The	student	was
judged	to	be	more	responsible	for	the	car	accident	in	the	cocaine	scenario,	presumably
because	there	were	no	mitigating	circumstances	that	reduced	respondents’	desire	to
assign	blame	(Alicke,	1992).	Under	the	blame	validation	model,	the	side-effect	effect
results	when	respondents	blame	the	harm-doer	for	the	outcome	he	has	caused	and	then
seek	to	justify	their	blame	by	interpreting	the	behavior	as	intentional.
This	model	is	somewhat	more	difficult	to	reconcile	with	the	present	findings,	primarily
because	of	its	reliance	on	automatic	negative	evaluations.	Abundant	evidence	exists	to
suggest	that	individuals	with	psychopathic	traits	show	weaker	automatic	responses	to
negatively	valenced	stimuli	and	information.	Psychopathy	is	associated	with	weakened
changes	in	autonomic	arousal	(for	example,	skin	conductance	and	potentiated	startle)	to
negative	stimuli,	whereas	psychopathic	and	non-psychopathic	responses	to	positive
stimuli	are	relatively	similar	(Herpertz	et	al.,	2001;	Levenston	et	al.,	2000;	Patrick,	1994;
Rothemund	et	al.,	2012;	Vaidyanathan	et	al.,	2011).	If	automatic	negative	evaluations
underlie	the	side-effect	effect,	one	would	expect	that	individuals	with	psychopathic	traits,
whose	(p.143)	 automatic	responses	to	negative	stimuli	are	not	as	strong	as	those	of
non-psychopathic	individuals,	would	generate	a	weaker	blame	response	in	response	to
foreseeable	harm	and	would	therefore	show	smaller	shifts	in	their	judgments	of
intentionality.	This	was	not	the	case	in	the	present	study.	Does	this	mean	that	the	types	of
scenario	used	to	test	the	side-effect	effect	do	not	generate	moral	emotions,	or	that	these
emotions	are	irrelevant	to	judgments	of	intentionality?
One	possibility	is	that	emotions	are	involved	in	the	side-effect	effect,	but	not	the	sorts	of
moral	emotions	that	are	impaired	in	psychopathy.	If	one	considers	specific	types	of
negative	evaluative	responses,	it	is	anger	that	is	most	closely	linked	to	blame	(Malle	and
Nelson,	2003;	Ortony	et	al.,	1988).	Anger	is	the	typical	emotional	response	to	a	negative
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outcome	that	is	perceived	to	be	caused	by	a	social	actor,	and	this	emotion	energizes	a
person	to	attempt	to	reverse	the	negative	outcome	(Frijda,	1986;	Roseman	et	al.,	1994).
Angry	responses	are	not	impaired	in	psychopathy—in	fact,	one	of	the	criteria	for
assessing	psychopathy	in	children	and	adolescents	focuses	on	tantrums	and	episodes	of
extreme	anger	(Blair,	2012;	Forth	et	al.,	2003).	The	same	is	true	for	individuals	with
damage	to	the	ventral	prefrontal	cortex,	who	are	also	prone	to	bouts	of	extreme	anger
(Blair	and	Cipolotti,	2000).	This	is	a	patient	population	in	whom	various	impairments	in
moral	reasoning	have	been	observed	(Koenigs	et	al.,	2007;	Young	et	al.,	2010),	but	in
whom	the	side-effect	effect	is	also	intact	(Young	et	al.,	2006).	This	leaves	open	the
possibility	that	blame	validation	relies	not	upon	generalized	negative	evaluative
responses,	but	specifically	upon	anger	responses	to	the	misdeeds	of	agents	who	did
foresee	or	could	have	foreseen	the	harmful	consequences	of	their	actions.	This
explanation	could	account	for	observations	of	an	intact	side-effect	effect	both	in
psychopathy	and	in	patients	with	ventromedial	prefrontal	lesions.	This	explanation	is	also
consistent	with	previous	findings	that	dissociable	emotion	systems	are	linked	to	different
forms	of	moral	judgment	(Rozin	et	al.,	1999)	and	that	affective	deficits	in	psychopathy
appear	to	be	largely	confined	to	fear	(Marsh	and	Blair,	2008;	Marsh	and	Cardinale,	2012;
Marsh	et	al.,	2011b),	with	affective	responding	related	to	emotions	such	as	disgust	and
anger	largely	intact.
A	weakness	of	this	argument,	however,	is	that	it	presumes	that	psychopathic	individuals
would	experience	anger	in	response	to	another	person	being	harmed.	In	the	general
population,	anger	is	a	common	response	to	harm	that	befalls	others,	as	demonstrated	by
moral	domain	(p.144)	 research	showing	anger	during	judgments	of	third-party
autonomy	violations	such	as	theft,	poisoning,	and	assault	(Rozin	et	al.,	1999).	Judgments
of	autonomy	violations	are	thought	to	entail	considerations	of	“harm,	rights,	justice,
freedom,	fairness,	individualism,	and	the	importance	of	individual	choice	and	liberty”	(p.
575).	That	first-person	harm-based	violations	evoke	anger	in	psychopathic	individuals	is
clear,	with	psychopathy	reliably	associated	with	angry	responses	to	provocation	and	goal
frustration	(Blackburn	and	Lee-Evans,	2011).	There	is,	by	contrast,	no	evidence	that
third-person	harm-based	moral	violations	result	in	anger,	and	indeed,	this	possibility
directly	contradicts	the	available	evidence	that	psychopathy	impairs	moral	judgments
about	third-party	harm.
Responses	to	neutral	outcomes
One	feature	of	the	current	paradigm	that	may	also	be	more	compatible	with	competence
theories	as	outlined	by	Knobe	(Knobe,	2010)	than	with	blame-validation	theories	is	the
responses	participants	gave	to	outcomes	of	neutral	valence.	Very	few	studies	have
examined	neutral	outcomes	in	assessments	of	the	side-effect	effect	(Knobe	and	Mendlow,
2004;	Phelan	and	Sarkissian,	2008).	Outcomes	in	the	present	study	that	were	considered
neutral	were	that	the	target	individual	in	the	story	would	fall	asleep,	tap	her	foot,	or	see	a
frog	for	the	first	time.	That	these	outcomes	were	in	fact	approximately	neutral	in	valence
is	supported	by	participants’	average	response	to	the	question	of	how	good	these
outcomes	were	(M=3.22)	which	fell	roughly	between	the	endpoints	of	the	scale	(1	and	5).
That	respondents	judge	the	intentionality	of	actions	in	tasks	such	as	these	by	comparing
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the	agent’s	behavior	to	that	of	a	prototypical	agent	requires	that	agency	be	construed	as
a	point	on	a	sliding	scale	ranging	from	no	intentionality	to	full	intentionality.	This	allows	an
agent	who	“does	not	care”	about	an	outcome	to	sometimes	be	viewed	as	in	favor	of	the
outcome	and	sometimes	not,	as	a	function	of	where	on	the	scale	the	prototypical	agent
would	be	expected	to	fall.	For	a	neutral	outcome,	the	prototypical	agent	would	be
expected	to	be	truly	neither	in	favor	of	nor	opposed	to	the	outcome—that	is,	to	fall	upon
the	midpoint	of	the	scale.	Thus,	agents	in	the	present	neutral-outcome	stories	would	have
views	consistent	with	the	prototypical	agent,	and	one	would	predict	that	they	would	be
ascribed	a	level	of	intentionality	somewhere	between	agents	who	bring	about	good
outcomes	and	those	(p.145)	 who	bring	about	bad	outcomes.	These	were	in	fact	the
results	we	obtained,	with	a	predominantly	linear	pattern	of	assigned	intentionality
observed	across	negative,	neutral,	and	positive	outcomes.	It	is	less	clear	why	these
results	would	be	obtained	under	the	blame	validation	model—here	one	might	anticipate	a
more	strongly	quadratic	pattern,	wherein	blame	responses	would	elicit	increased
attributions	of	intentionality	to	negative	outcomes	relative	to	positive	or	neutral
outcomes,	but	that	intentionality	would	not	be	construed	differently	across	neutral	and
positive	outcomes,	as	neither	would	elicit	a	blame	response	(although	it	is	possible	that
respondents	might	perceive	causally	impinging	on	another	person’s	outcomes	in	any	way
—negatively	or	not—to	violate	that	person’s	autonomy	to	some	small	degree,	and	might
thus	perceive	blameworthiness).	It	should	be	noted	that	group	means	suggest	the
possibility	that	psychopathic	adolescents’	responses	followed	a	more	quadratic	pattern
than	did	healthy	adolescents’,	although	the	absence	of	a	group	×	valence	interaction
indicates	that	the	patterns	of	effects	were	not	significantly	different	across	groups.	At	the
very	least,	however,	it	cannot	be	conclusively	stated	that	psychopathic	adolescents’
responses	did	not	follow	a	quadratic	pattern.	An	investigation	of	this	issue	in	a	study	with
a	larger	sample	size	might	permit	a	more	detailed	investigation	of	potential	differences	in
response	patterns	across	groups.
Neutrally	valenced	outcomes	also	yielded	another	interesting	pattern,	albeit	not	one	that
reached	statistical	significance,	which	is	that	the	largest	differences	in	the	mean
judgments	between	groups	was	usually	obtained	in	response	to	these	questions.
Adolescents	with	psychopathic	traits	showed	a	tendency	to	rate	all	outcomes	to	be
better,	and	this	difference	was	most	pronounced	in	response	to	neutral	outcomes.
Similarly,	adolescents	with	psychopathic	traits	as	a	rule	attributed	greater	intentionality	to
the	protagonists	across	the	vignettes,	but	the	mean	group	difference	was	again	largest	in
response	to	neutral	outcomes.	It	should	be	noted	that	a	similar	response	bias	toward
assigning	greater	intentionality	to	the	agents	across	conditions	has	been	observed	in
very	young	children	(3	years	old)	(Leslie	et	al.,	2006).	This	response	bias	in	the	youngest
children	to	attempt	this	task	was	attributed	to	their	failure	to	understand	the	task.	Could
the	same	thing	be	true	of	psychopathic	individuals	to	a	degree?	Many	have	speculated
that	psychopathic	traits	leave	those	who	are	affected	able	to	simulate	normal	human
responses	to	social	and	emotional	stimuli	without	grasping	the	basis	for	those	(p.146)
responses	(Blair	et	al.,	2006;	Cleckley,	1988).	This	leaves	them	prone	to	base	their	moral
judgments	more	on	social	norms	than	on	their	low-level	affective	or	empathic	responses
to	moral	dilemmas	(Blair	et	al.,	1995;	Blair,	1995).	In	response	to	questions	with	obvious
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socially	normative	responses	(is	it	good	to	upset	someone	or	to	make	them	happy?)
individuals	with	psychopathic	traits	can	provide	approximately	normal	responses.	But
perhaps	in	response	to	questions	with	less	obvious	socially	normative	value,	the
mechanisms	that	individuals	with	and	without	psychopathic	traits	rely	upon	to	answer	the
question	diverge,	which	results	in	a	divergence	of	their	responses	as	well.
Further	questions
Some	limitations	of	this	study	must	be	observed	in	interpreting	our	results.	First,	our
sample	of	participants	with	psychopathic	traits	was	small	relative	to	prior	studies	of	the
side-effect	effect.	It	was,	however,	comparable	to	sample	sizes	employed	in	a	number	of
previous	studies	of	moral	reasoning	in	psychopathy,	suggesting	that	reliable	effects	can
be	obtained	using	this	number	of	participants	(Blair,	1995;	Cima	et	al.,	2010;	Glenn	et	al.,
2009;	Gray	et	al.,	2003).	Moreover,	the	reliability	of	the	effect	was	extremely	similar
across	both	groups	we	tested,	and	was	comparable	to	the	results	from	larger	previous
studies	of	the	side-effect	effect,	suggesting	that	a	larger	sample	of	adolescents	with
psychopathic	traits	would	be	unlikely	to	yield	different	results	than	we	obtained.	A
question	that	cannot	be	answered	from	our	data,	however,	is	whether	a	group	of
adolescents	with	disruptive	behavior	disorders	but	low	levels	of	psychopathic	traits
would	show	the	same	results	as	the	adolescents	we	tested.	Increasing	evidence
supports	the	divergent	etiology	of	conduct	problems	in	these	two	subsamples	of
adolescents,	and	it	is	possible	that	patterns	of	moral	reasoning	across	these	groups
would	diverge	as	well.	Finally,	one	might	argue	that	a	question	that	emerges	from	our
findings	is	why	we	found	no	group	differences	in	responses	to	how	good	it	is	when	the
victim	of	a	negative	side-effect	becomes	upset.	Given	prior	findings	that	psychopathy
impairs	responses	to	victim	distress,	this	finding	could	be	seen	as	aberrant.	One
possibility	is	that	judgments	about	the	acceptability	of	victim	distress	vary	depending	on
how	the	question	is	framed.	It	has	been	previously	observed	that	asking	whether	a	moral
violation	is	“OK”	versus	whether	it	is	“bad”	yield	different	response	patterns	in
psychopathic	youths	(Blair,	1995),	perhaps	because	some	phrasings	are	more	(p.147)
likely	to	be	interpreted	as	referring	to	social	acceptability	versus	moral	acceptability.	It	is
possible	that	participants	interpreted	our	question	about	whether	the	various	outcomes
were	good	as	socially	normative	rather	than	as	a	moral	judgment.
Conclusions
Psychopathy—a	disorder	closely	associated	with	impaired	moral	judgments	and	behavior
—was	found	not	to	affect	responses	to	vignettes	testing	the	side-effect	effect.	This
suggests	that	information	about	moral	valence	does	not	influence	judgments	of
intentionality	in	psychopathy,	in	contrast	to	previous	findings	that	information	about
intentionality	does	affect	judgments	of	morality	in	psychopathy	(Young	et	al.,	2012).	This	is
consistent	with	an	emerging	consensus	that	moral	reasoning	is	unlikely	to	be	associated
with	a	single	set	of	mechanisms,	but	that	different	domains	of	moral	judgments	are
associated	with	dissociable	cognitive	processes	and	neural	mechanisms	(Parkinson	et	al.,
2011).	It	is	also	consistent	with	the	suggestion	that	whereas	the	behavior	of	individuals
with	psychopathic	traits	can	make	them	appear	“morally	blind,”	this	blindness	to	issues	of
morality	is	domain-specific,	reflecting	the	fact	that	psychopathy	is	associated	with	specific
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deficits	in	the	integrity	of	neural	systems	that	support	moral	reasoning	(Blair,	2007).
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